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ABSTRACT
Studies of risk preference have empirically established two regularities that are inconsistent with the
canonical expected utility model: (1) risk aversion over small gambles greatly exceeds risk aversion
over larger stakes and (2) insurance buyers play the lottery. This paper characterizes risk preferences
both theoretically and empirically in a world with two consumption goods, one of which involves
a commitment in that an adjustment cost must be paid when the good is sold. In this model, utility
over wealth is more curved locally than globally: individuals are more risk averse with respect to
moderate-scale income fluctuations than they are to large income fluctuations. Commitments also
create a gambling motive. The empirical importance of commitments is tested using the labor-supply
method of estimating risk aversion of Chetty (2003a). Global curvature is imputed using existing
labor supply elasticities, and variations in unemployment insurance laws are used to estimate local
curvature in a dynamic job search model. Commitments significantly change preferences over
wealth: The local coefficient of relative risk aversion is an order of magnitude larger than the global
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chetty@econ.berkeley.eduThe United States spent approximately $200 billion on social insurance in 2000.1 The
large size and continued growth of social safety nets in the US and other countries pose an
interesting puzzle in public ﬁnance. Work by Baily (1978) and Gruber (1997) suggests that
the optimal beneﬁt level for unemployment insurance is lower than 20% of an individual’s
pre-unemployment wage, and perhaps even 0.2 T h er e a s o ni st h a te m p i r i c a le s t i m a t e so ft h e
distortionary costs of unemployment insurance tend to outweigh its consumption-smoothing
beneﬁts for reasonable levels of risk aversion. The diﬀerence between these theoretical
predictions and actual beneﬁt levels, which are around 50% of pre-unemployment wages, is
striking.
This “social insurance puzzle” can be viewed as one manifestation of the general problem
of explaining moderate-stake risk aversion using canonical expected utility theory.3 Rabin
(2000) gives a powerful calibration theorem which shows that expected utility with strictly
concave utility over wealth cannot explain observed risk preferences over small and large
gambles simultaneously. To take one notable example, an expected utility maximizer who
rejects a 50-50 bet of losing $1000 and winning $1010 will reject a 50-50 bet of losing $100,000
or winning any amount.4 In other words, the level of risk aversion implied by typical
preferences over gambles involving moderate stakes — such as the demand for a substantial
amount of unemployment, automobile, and non-catastrophic health insurance — translates
1Here, I deﬁne social insurance as programs that insure income ﬂuctuations. Unemployment Insurance
costs were $25 billion in 2000 (Source: Ways and Means Green Book 2000); Workers Compensation, $56
billion (National Academy of Social Insurance); and Survivors Beneﬁts and Disability Insurance, $113 billion
(Oﬃce of Management and Budget).
2This is because the consumption-smoothing beneﬁts of UI are outweighed by its distortionary costs.
The zero replacement rate result assumes a coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion less than 2, as estimated e.g.
in Chetty (2003a). Higher levels of risk aversion obviously increase the optimal replacement rate.
3An alternative view is that social insurance reﬂects government ineﬃciency. Those who take this view
may prefer to resolve this puzzle using a political economy model that shows why extensive social safety nets
emerge even when they do not improve social welfare. This approach is not considered here.
4This claim requires that agents reject the $1000/$1010 bet at all wealth levels, but similar results are
obtained when the range of wealth levels over which risk preferences are observed is restricted.
1into unrealistic levels of risk aversion over larger stakes.
An important assumption in Rabin’s calibration argument and in most existing models of
risk preference is that agents consume one good, i.e., consumption is a composite commodity.
This assumption is innocuous if agents can substitute freely among consumption goods at
all times. In practice, however, substituting among goods within a period is costly. Many
g o o d s ,s u c ha sh o u s i n ga n dv e h i c l e s ,i n v o l v e“ c o m m i t m e n t s ”—at r a n s a c t i o nc o s tm u s tb e
paid to change consumption of these goods. Because of these adjustment costs, families
tend to retain most of their commitments during small or short-lived income ﬂuctuations.
For instance, Gruber (1998) ﬁnds that less than 5% of the unemployed move out of their
homes during a spell.
The central hypothesis of this paper is that incorporating consumption commitments into
the expected utility framework can explain the moderate-stake insurance puzzle as well as
several other phenomena that are inconsistent with a one-good model. While adjustment
costs have been studied in various contexts, their eﬀects on preferences over wealth have not
been fully explored. I analyze a model in which agents consume two goods, housing and
food. An adjustment cost must be paid to sell a house. The key theoretical result is that
agents are relatively more risk averse with respect to moderate-scale income ﬂuctuations
than they are to large-scale income ﬂuctuations. The intuition is easiest to see in a model
with unrestricted borrowing and saving. In this world, agents rationally choose not to move
out of their houses while wealth ﬂuctuates within an (s,S) band deﬁned by their previous
housing choice. Since the marginal utility of wealth diminishes more quickly over a smaller
set of goods, the “local” curvature of utility over wealth within the (s,S) band is greater
than the “global” curvature of utility over wealth outside this band (see Figure 1). For
example, if a family needs to reduce total expenditure by 10% and has pre-committed half of
2its income, they have to reduce spending on items such as food and clothing by 20%. The
welfare costs of such a concentrated reduction in consumption can be large, driving up the
beneﬁts of insurance within the (s,S) band.
Commitments also rationalize gambling, by eﬀectively generating non-concavities in util-
ity over wealth. The motive for gambling arises because the marginal utility of wealth at
S − ε is lower than the marginal utility of wealth at S + ε. T h i si sb e c a u s et h em a r g i n a l
dollar is spent only on food at S − ε, whereas it is allocated eﬃciently over both goods at
S + ε. C o m m i t t e da g e n t sp r e f e rb e t st h a th a v eb i gp a y o ﬀs; fair gambles that have payoﬀs
within the (s,S) band are rejected. The model therefore oﬀers a parsimonious explanation
for why insurance buyers also play the lottery, a puzzle potentially related to important
economic issues such as real wage rigidity.5
To evaluate the empirical importance of commitments for risk preferences, I estimate
the local and global risk aversion parameters using the methodology of Chetty (2003a), who
shows that the curvature of utility can be inferred from data on labor supply choices.6 The
key idea is that there is a direct connection between the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion
and the ratio of the income elasticity of labor supply to the wage elasticity, conditional on
the degree of complementarity between consumption and leisure. Starting with the case
of additive utility — where consumption and leisure are not complementary — Chetty shows
that estimates of the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion are not very sensitive to plausible
5The lottery-insurance puzzle has posed problems for expected utility theory since its advent. Friedman
and Savage (1948) propose nonconcave utility as an explanation for this behavior in defense of expected
utility theory. The issue has been revisited more recently by Becker, Murphy, and Werning (1997) and
Hartley and Farrell (2002).
6The main beneﬁt of using this method of estimating risk aversion is that it permits us to distinguish
the commitments model from competing theories of moderate-stake risk aversion such as loss aversion. In
particular, local curvature is estimated from wealth perturbations that do not always pass through the kink
in a loss-averse agent’s utility function. It follows that the high estimate of local curvature is evidence
for a higher rate of diminishing marginal utility when agents have commitments, and not simply reference-
dependent behavior.
3perturbations in the complementarity parameter. It follows that data on labor supply choices
are suﬃcient to make inferences about risk aversion at speciﬁc wealth levels: in particular,
l a r g ei n c o m ee ﬀects imply a high degree of curvature.7
In the present paper, I ﬁrst show that existing estimates of labor supply responses to
permanent income and wage changes place an upper bound on the global curvature of utility
over wealth of 1.25. I then turn to estimating the local curvature parameter. Local
curvature can be estimated by observing the labor supply of agents who experience small
wage and unearned income ﬂuctuations, during which they are unlikely to move out of their
houses or sell their cars. One such group is the set of individuals who experience short
spells of unemployment. Diﬀerences in unemployment insurance laws across states and
time create variation in eﬀective wages and unearned income. Observing the relationship
between unemployment durations and these variations permits identiﬁcation of the income
and price eﬀects necessary to infer local risk aversion.
To build intuition on the identiﬁcation strategy, I ﬁrst summarize the results of Chetty
(2003b), who estimates reduced-form semiparametric hazard models for job-ﬁnding after
unemployment. These estimates strongly suggest that elasticity of unemployment duration
with respect to unearned income is large relative to the wage elasticity, consistent with high
local curvature. However, there is no analytic means of translating these reduced-form
estimates into a number for local curvature. I therefore estimate the structural parameters
of a job search model in which unemployed individuals choose consumption and search
eﬀort in each week. Numerical dynamic programming methods are used to compute the
optimal search eﬀort path given a set of parameters. A likelihood function for the observed
unemployment duration data is constructed from the unemployment exit probabilities that
7See Chetty (2003a) for further details of the connection between risk aversion and labor supply.
4come out of this model, and its parameter set, which includes local curvature, is estimated
by maximizing likelihood.
The point estimate of the local coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion in the search model
is 7.37, and the null hypothesis that local and global curvature are equal can be rejected
with a p value less than 0.01. This result is robust to a number of alternative speciﬁcations
of the model. Importantly, a comparison of the predicted unemployment exit probabilities
with the observed probabilities indicates that the local curvature estimate is identiﬁed from
precisely the variation in UI laws that one would expect based on the reduced-form analysis,
suggesting that the parametric assumptions are not driving the results.
The estimate of local curvature is used to construct an empirical utility over wealth with
commitments. This utility escapes Rabin’s calibration critique while retaining a consequen-
talist expected utility framework. Since preferences over wealth are a primitive in a wide set
of economic problems, commitments can potentially shed light on a wide range of economic
questions, including intertemporal substitution, labor supply responses to taxation, equity
risk premiums, and optimal social insurance. For instance, in a standard model of unem-
ployment insurance, the estimate of local curvature implies an optimal replacement rate for
pre-unemployment wages of 44%, whereas the canonical one-good model predicts 0.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents the main theo-
retical implications of the commitments model for preferences over wealth. Section 2 shows
how labor supply data can be used to test this model and derives an upper bound for the
global curvature parameter. It also outlines the unemployment insurance law variation used
to identify local curvature and reviews the reduced-form results of Chetty (2003b). Section
3s p e c i ﬁes and presents estimates of the dynamic search model. The paper concludes by
discussing implications of the commitments model for a set of economic puzzles.
51 Commitments and Risk Preferences
The leading example of a good involving a commitment is housing. Changing consumption of
housing typically entails moving expenses and large transaction costs. Broker fees are around
5% of a home’s listing price, and early termination of a lease often entails at least a one month
penalty in rent. In addition, leaving a neighborhood and changing children’s schools could
have direct welfare costs. More generally, any durable good involves some commitment, as
market resale values are signiﬁcantly lower than actual values. The diﬀerence between the
price of a new car and a one year old car suggests that the loss from reselling a durable is
at least 10% of its value, perhaps due to a lemons problem.8 Finally, a number of services
require explicit contracts and penalties for early termination — examples include personal
health insurance, health clubs, cellular phones, and cable television.9 Goods involving
commitments comprise a signiﬁcant portion of most households’ budgets.10 Table 1 shows
that the typical household in the US allocates approximately half of its net-of-tax income to
the costly-to-adjust goods described above.11
The eﬀects of such adjustment costs on optimal policies have been modelled formally
since Scarf’s (1959) pioneering work on inventory decisions. In the consumption literature,
8This ﬁgure is based on author’s calculations from a sample of twenty 2001 model vehicles sold in the
U.S. On average, a one-year old model with 10,000 miles in excellent condition sells for 23% less than the
original sticker price. Assuming straight-line depreciation over ten years, the implied resale loss is 13%.
9Late payments do not eliminate commitments. In the event of an income shock, the individual must
still eventually pay the bill. The ability to make late payments is as an additional credit channel: it helps
only by oﬀering people longer smoothing horizons to dampen shocks.
10One may wonder why households choose to commit so much if the welfare costs of income ﬂuctuations are
large. Why not rent instead of purchase, in an eﬀort to reduce commitments? This argument ignores market
imperfections such as incomplete information, which make ownership advantageous. Glaeser and Shapiro
(2002) argue that the agency problems associated with renting create strong incentives for homeownership.
Agency costs also explain why it is often rational to purchase rather than rent cars, appliances, and furniture.
11At least the ﬁrst ﬁve categories in Table 1 could involve commitments. Certain expenditures, such
as health care and education, may be committed or discretionary. As the exact fraction of committed
expenditures is not crucial to the analysis that follows, this deﬁnition is left open to interpretation.
6Grossman and Laroque (1990) show that the low level of covariance between consumption
and asset prices can be explained by transaction costs for a durable good. The subsequent
literature on illiquid durables has tested this model and found that it provides a good de-
scription of many types of consumption decisions; individuals appear to change consumption
of illiquid durables infrequently and are responsive to the magnitude of transaction costs.12
More recently, Martin (2003) and Flavin and Nakagawa (2003) calibrate a model that has
adjustment costs for housing and costless adjustment over food, and ﬁnd that it ﬁts con-
sumption data better than neoclassical and habit-formation models. However, existing work
has not fully explored the eﬀects of commitments on preferences over wealth, in particular
the diﬀerence between moderate-stake and large-stake risk aversion.13
To do so, this section ﬁrst develops a two-good model of commitments and shows that
under certain conditions the agent will follow an (s,S) policy for commitment consumption.
I then show that commitments aﬀect risk preferences in two basic ways: they augment risk
aversion and create a gambling motive.
1.1 Model and Consumption Dynamics
Consider a T period economy with two consumption goods, housing (h) and food(f). Selling
a house that provides h units of housing services per period entails a transaction cost kh.14
12For instance, Attanasio (2000) estimates an (s,S) model using data from the Consumer Expenditure
Survey to show that car stocks are adjusted when non-durable consumption falls to 1/3 of its original
level or doubles relative to the current value of the car (e.g. due to depreciation of the capital good).
More recently, Ferreira (2003) shows that small variations in property taxes cause signiﬁcant lock-in eﬀects,
reducing homeowner mobility.
13Much of the existing work on adjustment costs uses a continuous-time framework with smooth diﬀusion
processes for wealth. Since these studies do not explore the eﬀects of small vs. large gambles, they do not
discuss the distinction between local and global risk aversion emphasized here.
14It does not matter whether k is a real monetary cost or a psychological cost incurred due to moving.
Results also remain identical if the transaction cost is incurred when a good is purchased rather than sold
(e.g., an initiation fee).
7Choose units so that the price of both f and h is ﬁxed at 1.L e t u(f,h) denote the per-period
utility over food and housing, and assume that it satisﬁes the usual neoclassical regularity
conditions: u twice diﬀerentiable, uf > 0,u h > 0,u ff < 0, uhh < 0.L e tWt denote wealth at
time t and Vt+1(Wt+1,h t) the expected continuation payoﬀ from entering period t +1with
wealth Wt+1 and a house ht. The agent earns stochastic income yt in period t,w h i c hm a y
reﬂect job-related or asset market risk.
The optimal consumption path {ft,h t} can be found using backward induction. In any
period t the agent’s chooses consumption by solving
max
ft,ht
u(ft,h t)+Vt+1(Wt+1,h t) (1)
subject to the intertemporal budget constraint
Wt+1 = Wt + yt − ft − ht (2)
I make two assumptions to simplify the exposition and highlight the key intuitions that
arise from the commitments model. First, all uncertainty is resolved in period 1: the agent
earns a known income of yt(y1) t h a tm a yd e p e n do nt h er e a l i z a t i o no fy1 in all subsequent
periods. Second, I abstract from capital market imperfections that prevent the agent from
borrowing against future income, and assume that the discount and interest rates are 0.T h e
eﬀects of these assumptions on the key results are discussed at the end of this section.
To characterize the optimal path of {f,h}, ﬁrst observe that the agent’s consumption
from period 1 onward will be smooth: ft = f1,h t = h1 ∀t>1. Therefore, the optimal f∗
1
and h∗
1 are functions of the present value of wealth in period 1,w h i c hId e n o t eb yW,a n d
the previously purchased home, h0.
8Solving for the optimal policy for a general speciﬁcation of the utility function is infea-
sible. The following assumptions lead to a simple analytical characterization of the agent’s
consumption decision in period 1.
A1 Inada conditions: lim
f→0
uf = ∞, lim
f→∞
uf =0
A2 Utility u(f,h) has an additively separable representation:
∃u1,u 2 s.t. u(f,h) >u (f
0,h
0) ⇔ u1(f)+u2(h) >u 1(f
0)+u2(h
0)
The following lemma shows that it is optimal to follow an (s,S) rule for housing choice in
period 1 under these assumptions — the agent only sells the house purchased in the previous
period if wealth rises or falls above some threshold values.







h0 W ∈ (s,S)
argmaxu(f1,h 1) s.t. f1 + h1 = W−kh0
T−1 W/ ∈ (s,S)
Proof. Let vm(W) denote the indirect utility from wealth W when moving and v0(W)
denote indirect utility of wealth W if one retains h1 = h0. Observe that v0(W0) >v m(W0) at
some wealth level W0 where h0 =a r gm a xu(f1,h 1) s.t. f1+h1 = W0
T−1.M o v i n g i s s u b o p t i m a l
at W0 because it results in both lower f and h. In addition, using A1, it is easy to show
that as W t e n d st o0o r∞, vm(W) − v0(W) can be made arbitrarily large, so moving is
optimal for suﬃciently small or large values of W.
An (s,S) policy requires that there are exactly two values of W at which v0(W)=vm(W).
T h ef a c tt h a tm o v i n gi so p t i m a lf o rs o m es m a l lo rl a r g ew e a l t hl e v e l sb u tn o tf o rW0 implies
via continuity and the Intermediate Value Theorem that there are at least two such values.
9Given diﬀerentiability, a suﬃcient condition for there to be at most two such intersections is
t h a tt h e r ei sa tm o s to n ew e a l t hl e v e lW such that v0
0(W)=v0
m(W).T h e E n v e l o p e T h e o r e m
implies that v0
0(W)=( T−1)uf(f0) where f0(W)=W/(T−1)−h0 denotes food consumption
at wealth W when not moving, while v0
m(W)=( T −1)uf(fm(W)) where fm(W) denotes the
optimal food choice when reoptimizing over both f and h.
The key step of the proof is to observe that when we choose an additively separable
representation of u, uf(f)=uf(f0)= ⇒ f = f0. Hence, it suﬃces to establish that f0(W)=
fm(W), which must be the case because f0
0(W)=1>f 0
m(W) ∀W.
The intuition underlying this result is straightforward. Suppose the agent’s experiences a
large negative wealth shock in period 1. Then he will be forced to reduce food consumption
drastically in order to maintain the housing co m m i t m e n tt h a th ep r e v i o u s l ym a d e . S i n c e
such a sharp reduction in food consumption causes a large reduction in utility, it becomes
optimal to pay the adjustment cost and move into a smaller home. Conversely, if wealth
rises sharply, rather than allocating all of his extra wealth to food, whose marginal utility
eventually diminishes to zero, he decides to pay an adjustment cost and fully reoptimize his
consumption bundle, upgrading to a large house.
When utility is additively separable, the agent is always better oﬀ avoiding payment of
the ﬁxed cost and staying in the same house when he does not experience a large wealth
shock. The separability condition rules out the possibility of oscillation between moving
and not moving within this intermediate range. For instance, if uf(f,h) falls sharply when
h is signiﬁcantly above h0, it can be optimal to move after moderate increases in wealth
but then optimal not to move for slightly larger wealth shocks. Separability rules out such
pathologies by making the marginal utility of food consumption independent of the house
one owns. Importantly, empirical evidence (see e.g., Attanasio (2000)) conﬁr m st h a ta g e n t s
10do follow (s,S) policies over the consumption of illiquid goods that involve ﬁxed adjustment
costs. Hence, complementarities between non-commitment and commitment goods do not
appear to be large enough to cause deviations from this intuitive policy in practice.
In summary, commitment yields an inaction region over which wealth shocks are borne
strictly on the non-commitment (food) margin; outside this inaction region, wealth shocks
are split between both goods. The next subsection shows that this feature of consumption
has important implications for the agent’s induced risk preferences in period 1.
1.2 Preferences over Wealth
Let v(W)=m a x ( vm(W),v 0(W)) denote the agent’s indirect utility from wealth W in period
1. This indirect utility function determines the agent’s risk preferences. I will show that
agents are more risk averse within the (s,S) band than outside the (s,S) band by computing
the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion for these two cases.
Let γf =
−ufff
uf (f,h) represent the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion over food, which
reﬂects the rate at which the marginal utility of food consumption diminishes at a given
point (f,h).L e t εuf,h =
−ufhh
uf denote the negative of the elasticity of uf with respect to
h, which captures the degree of complementarity between housing and food consumption.
Finally, let εf,W denote the elasticity of food consumption in period 1 with respect to W.
With this notation, at any wealth level W,t h ea g e n t ’ sc o e ﬃcient of relative risk aversion











= γfεf,W + εuf,hεh,W (3)
11The intuition for (3) is as follows. Utility maximization requires that the marginal utility
of wealth equals the marginal utility of food at the optimum; that is, vw = uf. Hence, the
change in vW from a 1% increase in W is reﬂected by the change in uf. The marginal utility
of food itself changes for two reasons: ﬁrst, because increased food consumption reduces
uf and second, because increased housing consumption aﬀects uf.T h e t w o t e r m s i n ( 3 )
correspond to these two eﬀects.
Let us now apply (3) to distinguish risk aversion when the agent retains his housing
commitment and when the agent adjusts consumption on all margins. Let γg(W) denote
the “global” coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion at wealth level W when an agent adjusts
consumption of both housing and food in period 1. Similarly, let γl(W) denote the “local”
coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion at wealth level W when the agent chooses to adjust
consumption only on the food margin, leaving h ﬁxed at h0. It is helpful to distinguish
the elasticity of food consumption in the two cases by the same superscripts: εl
f,W when
h is ﬁxed and ε
g
f,W when unconstrained. The reason for the local/global terminology will
become clear shortly. I make two additional assumptions to characterize preferences over
wealth:
A3 Curvature of utility over food is constant: γf(f)=
−ufff
uf (f)=γf ∀f



































f and A4 =⇒ εuf,h < γf, it follows that γl(W) > γg(W).
Lemma 2 shows that local curvature is greater than global curvature. To understand
this result, let us ﬁr s tf o c u so nt h ec a s ei nw h i c hεuf,h =0 , in which case (3) simpliﬁes to
γW = γfεf,W.T h e d i ﬀerence between local and global risk aversion arises directly from
the diﬀerence in the wealth elasticity of food consumption in the two cases. When housing
consumption is ﬁxed and all wealth shocks are borne strictly on the food margin, a 1%
increase in wealth translates into an increase of
W/(T−1)
f % in food consumption. When
agents have commitments, h0 > 0 and f< W
T−1, implying that the curvature of utility
over wealth is strictly greater than the curvature of utility over food. This is because a
1% increase in wealth causes food consumption to rise by more than 1%, amplifying the
elasticity of marginal utility with respect to wealth. To see this more concretely, suppose a
family needs to reduce total expenditure by 10% because of an income shock. If half of their
income has been pre-committed, they have to reduce spending on adjustable items such as
food by 20%, raising the marginal utility of wealth sharply.
When both housing and food consumption are adjustable, a 1% increase in wealth results
in an increase of εf,W < 1% in food consumption. The total change in marginal utility is only
εf,Wγf, since food consumption goes up by less than one percent for a one percent increase
in wealth. The marginal utility of wealth declines more slowly with wealth when both goods
are adjustable because the marginal dollar can be allocated more eﬃciently across diﬀerent
types of consumption.15
In the more general case when housing and food consumption are complementary or
substitutable (εuf,h 6=0 ), we must also take into account the eﬀect of increased housing
15These results require constant γf because the agent consumes diﬀerent amounts of food when committed
and not committed to a ﬁxed level of housing. If curvature varies with the level of food consumption, the
result can loosely be interpreted as stating that “holding ﬁxed food consumption” local curvature is greater
than global curvature.
13consumption on the marginal utility of food when computing global curvature. If greater
housing consumption raises the marginal utility of food (ufh > 0), this eﬀect further lowers
γg, increasing the diﬀerence between γg and γl. If housing and food are substitutes (ufh < 0),
as long as the marginal utility of food is less sensitive to changes in h than direct changes in
f — an intuitively reasonable condition — global risk aversion remains lower than local risk
aversion.
Putting Lemma 2 together with the agent’s consumption policy yields the ﬁrst important
feature of preferences over wealth with commitments.
Proposition 1 [Local Risk Aversion] Under A1-A4, committed agents are more risk
averse locally than globally:
γ(W) > γ(W
0) ∀W ∈ (s,S),W
0 / ∈ (s,S)
Proof. Lemma 1 implies the agent will adjust h iﬀ W/ ∈ (s,S). The proposition then
follows immediately from Lemma 2.
This result is a straightforward combination of the two lemmas. Small wealth shocks
are rationally accommodated over a small base of expenditure, with rapidly diminishing
marginal utility. Larger shocks make it optimal to move out of one’s house, reducing the
rate at which the marginal utility of money deteriorates.16 Consequently, “local” curvature —
that is, curvature with respect to small or moderate wealth shocks — is greater than “global”
curvature, which reﬂects risk preferences with respect to large-scale gambles. This property
16The same intuition carries over to a model with multiple commitments. However, optimal consumption
policies in a model with more than one committed good are not simple; for instance, the initial guess that
agent’s will have a set of (s,S) bands that are progressively larger for goods with larger adjustment costs is
not correct. This is because it can be optimal to abandon one large commitment instead of several smaller
commitments. What remains true, however, is that utility will be most concave when the agent retains all
his commitments and least concave when he does not retain any.
14of indirect utility over wealth is illustrated in Figure 1, which plots indirect utility over
wealth for a Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcation of u.
The key implication of this result is that expected utility maximizers with commitments
can exhibit high degrees of “moderate stakes” risk aversion, in the terminology of Rabin
(2000), while having “non-ridiculous” levels of risk aversion over larger stakes. This is
in contrast to the implications of expected utility in the canonical one-good model, where
Rabin gives a calibration argument which shows that “anything but virtual risk neutrality
over modest stakes implies manifestly unrealistic risk aversion over large stakes.” The
intuition for Rabin’s result is that risk aversion over moderate stakes places a lower bound
on the rate at which marginal utility of money deteriorates; under the assumption that utility
is everywhere concave, risk preferences in the small therefore place constraints on feasible
risk preferences in the large. These constraints turn out to be very strong: To take one
striking example, an expected utility maximizer who rejects a 50-50 bet of losing $1000 and
winning $1010 must reject a 50-50 bet of losing $100,000 or winning any amount.
Proposition 1 also sheds light on the “social insurance puzzle” that motivated this paper.
The value of partial insurance is greater in situations such as temporary unemployment
where commitments are retained and income shocks are concentrated on a small fraction
of consumption, augmenting the diﬀerence between marginal utility in the good and bad
states. Generous insurance programs for such shocks may be welfare-enhancing despite the
behavioral distortions that they induce. However, for more catastrophic outcomes, such as
permanent disability, an increment in insurance coverage may be less valuable because the
diﬀerence in marginal utility between the good and bad states is not as high.
The reason that moderate-stake ﬂuctuations are of relatively greater concern to commit-
ted agents is because there are non-concavities in utility over wealth at the threshold levels
15s and S where the agent abandons his commitment.
Proposition 2 [Gambling Motive]: Under A1-A2, utility over wealth is locally convex at
y1 = s and y1 = S:
∃ε > 0 s.t. vW(s − ε) <v W(s + ε) and vW(S − ε) <v W(S + ε)
Proof. Take any ε > 0.S i n c e v(W)=m a x ( vm(W),v 0(W)), vw(s−ε)=v0
m(s−ε) while
vw(s+ε)=v0
0(s−ε).S i n c e v0(s+ε) >v m(s+ε) and v0(s−ε) >v m(s−ε), v0
0(s) >v 0
m(s).
Hence, by continuity, ∃ε > 0 s.t. vW(s − ε)=v0
m(s − ε) <v 0
0(s + ε)=vW(s + ε).A n
analogous argument establishes that indirect utility is locally convex at S.
To see the intuition for why commitments generate a desire to gamble, consider an indi-
vidual who is deciding whether to buy a candy bar that costs $1 or a fair lottery ticket for $1
that will pay $1 million if he wins. A one good model assumes that the agent will buy one
million candy bars if he wins the lottery (or one million units of the composite commodity).
This is not optimal because the marginal utility of candy is diminishing, and the agent would
be better oﬀ getting one candy bar with certainty. However, in a world with commitments,
t h ea g e n tw i l lb u ym o r et h a nj u s tc a n d yi fh ew i n st h el o t t e r y . W h i l et h e$ 1h eh a si nh a n d
cannot be spent to buy a better house or car, the $1 million dollars can.17
Committed individuals may buy lottery tickets to have a chance at “a new lifestyle”
while buying insurance to reduce other types of wealth ﬂuctuations.18 The model predicts
17The kinks in the utility function are an artefact of the assumption that all uncertainty is resolved in
period 1. If uncertainty persists, utility will retain non-concavities, but these will be smooth locally convex
regions rather than kinks.
18Friedman and Savage (1948) were the ﬁrst to propose non-concave utility as an explanation of the
lottery-insurance puzzle. Given economists’ predilection for diminishing marginal utility over goods, several
models have been proposed as foundations for the Friedman-Savage utility. Kwang (1965) presents a model
in which some goods are indivisible, creating an incentive to gamble. Flemming (1969) considers a model
16that agents are more likely to prefer lotteries that yield highly skewed outcomes (big payoﬀs)
rather than those that yield small payoﬀs and do not give the opportunity to drop many
commitments. Interestingly, this prediction ﬁts with Golec and Tamarkin’s (1998) ﬁnding
that racetrack bettors “crave skewness.”
H o wd ot h et w op r o p o s i t i o n sc h a n g ei nar i c h er model where uncertainty persists after
period 1 and agents face credit constraints? To answer this question, let us focus on the
case where ufh =0and simply assume that the agent follows an (s,S) rule for housing.
When uncertainty is persistent, consumption is no longer smooth after the ﬁrst period.
Risk preferences in period 1 are determined by the value function over wealth v(W1),w h i c h
is the present value of expected utility from entering period 1 with wealth W1. Utility
maximization still yields vW1 = uf, so (3) still applies for the coeﬃcient of relative risk
aversion for the value function. But future uncertainty and credit constraints aﬀect the
extent to which εl
f1,W1 diﬀers from ε
g
f1,W1. When the probability of moving in future periods
is high — e.g., because of high anticipated variance in wealth — εl
f1,W1 may not be much
higher than ε
g
f1,W1 b e c a u s ei tc o u l db eo p t i m a lt os a v eal a r g ef r a c t i o no ft h ee x t r aw e a l t h
and use it when buying a new house instead of spending it on food. In essence, the
agent can also change future consumption of state-contingent commodities in future periods
when he will be outside the (s,S) band, reducing the sensitivity of f1 to W1 in the current
period and attenuating the diﬀerence between γl and γg. C r e d i tc o n s t r a i n t sa c ti nt h e
opposite direction by severing the link between current and future periods, further amplifying
the eﬀect of commitments on risk aversion. Strong credit constraints reduce the number
of upgrades in which agents consume an illiquid durable whose quality is continually improving over time;
in this model, agents’ utilities over wealth have non-concavities at each of the points where it is optimal to
upgrade. Both the Kwang and Flemming models do not predict high local curvature of utility speciﬁct o
an agent’s initial wealth level, and can therefore be distinguished from the model of this paper using the
empirical methodology discussed below.
17of state-contingent commodities over which consumption can be adjusted, forcing greater
concentration of adjustment on f1 if h remains unchanged.
The theoretical results suggest that commitments may induce important changes in pref-
erences over wealth, but give little guidance on the magnitude of this eﬀect. In view of (??),
one indirect method of testing the model’s importance is to compare εf,W within and outside
the (s,S) band. Flavin and Nakagawa (2003) and Martin (2003) essentially implement such
a test by showing that the dynamics of food consumption correspond much more closely to
those predicted by the commitments model than to a neoclassical model without adjustment
costs.
In the remainder of this paper, I take a more direct approach to analyzing the empirical
relationship between commitments and risk preferences by estimating local and global curva-
ture. Since γl and γg are sensitive to the speciﬁcation the credit constraints and underlying
process for wealth, I incorporate these features into the estimation procedure by choosing
parameters that, if at all, bias against ﬁnding γg < γl. Using the resulting estimates, I
report numbers for local and global curvature that apply to the benchmark case modelled
above, in which there is no uncertainty in future periods and no credit constraints.19
2 Testing the Model
While the commitments model oﬀers an explanation for the diﬀerence between local and
global risk aversion, other theories can also explain the same facts.20 This section shows
how the commitments theory can be distinguished from competing models empirically, and
19Once γl and γg are known for this benchmark case, it is easy to infer risk preferences for other speciﬁ-
cations of the model.
20Machina (1987) and Camerer (1992) review other non-expected utility theories that have been proposed
as explanations for modest-scale risk aversion.
18evaluates the importance of commitments as a determinant of preferences over wealth.
The leading existing explanation of moderate-stake risk aversion is loss-aversion, advo-
cated by Rabin (2000) among others. The utility of loss averse agents is a function of
changes in consumption from a reference point rather than levels of consumption. The
utility beneﬁt of increases in consumption is smaller than the utility loss of corresponding
reductions. This creates a kink in utility at the reference point, making agents locally risk
averse.21 The commitments model is not inconsistent with loss aversion. In fact, it is
quite clear that certain types of behavior are not the result of commitments and must come
from reference-dependent behavior. For instance, the “ﬁrst-order” risk aversion over very
small stakes ($10-$100) documented by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) cannot arise from
commitments because utility remains locally linear in this model. I therefore attempt to
show that commitments are an important determinant of preferences over moderate-stake
risks, and do not falsify the potential importance of loss aversion in explaining other aspects
of preferences.
I test the commitments model by estimating the diﬀerence between local and global
curvature. The standard loss aversion model does not predict that utility is highly curved
away from the individual’s reference point, whereas the commitments model (which does not
have an explicit notion of reference points) predicts a high degree of curvature throughout
the (s,S) band.22 I show below that the estimates of γl are at least partially identiﬁed from
perturbations in wealth that are strictly below the reference point, implying that γl > γg
21More precisely, loss aversion must be coupled with “narrow bracketing” — treating individual decisions
as isolated events — to explain local risk aversion. While loss aversion is typically a direct assumption about
preferences, Brunnermeier (1997) shows that boundedly rational agents with neoclassical preferences can
exhibit loss aversion.
22In fact, Brunnermeier’s (1997) model of loss aversion as an explanation of local risk aversion predicts
that utility is convex below the reference. Other non-expected utility theories that explain local risk aversion
(reviewed e.g. in Machina, 1987) also do not predict that utility is highly curved locally.
19is evidence for commitments and a high rate of diminishing marginal utility over moderate
wealth gains, rather than loss aversion.
Implementing this test requires a method of estimating the curvature of utility at various
wealth levels. I apply the methodology of Chetty (2003a), who shows that the curvature of
utility can be estimated from data on labor supply choices. The key idea is that there is a
direct connection between the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion and the ratio of the income
elasticity of labor supply to the wage elasticity, conditional on the degree of complementarity
between consumption and leisure. Starting with the case of additive utility, Chetty shows
that estimates of the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion are not sensitive to plausible pertur-
bations in the complementarity parameter. It follows that data on labor supply choices can
be used to make inferences about risk aversion at speciﬁc wealth levels, restricting attention
to the case in which utility is additively separable in consumption and leisure.
In the present paper, I extend this methodology to estimate local and global curvature
when agents have commitments. The basic strategy is to estimate global curvature from
large changes in income and wages that induce agents to move out of their (s,S) bands,
and estimate local curvature from small variations in income and wages during which agents
retain commitments.23
2.1 Estimation of Global Curvature
To see how global curvature can be estimated from labor supply behavior, let us introduce a
binary labor-leisure decision into the T period model of housing and food consumption above.
For expositional simplicity, assume that utility is additive in consumption and leisure, i.e.
23In a model with more than one committed good, utility over wealth will have a spectrum of curvatures,
ranging from local to global, as the degree of commitment falls. In this world, b γ
g is an estimate of curvature
near the right end of the spectrum, while b γ
l is an estimate nearer to the left end.
20the cross-partial between consumption and leisure is 0.24 I adopt the following notation:
l =0when the agent does not work and l =1when he does; ψ denotes disutility of working;
y is unearned income; and w is the net-of-tax wage. I assume that unearned income and
wage are constant over time.
Let us focus on labor supply decisions in period 1, which are made after agents have made
commitments in period 0. Suppose there is heterogeneity among agents in disutility of labor:
ψ ∼ f0(ψ). As a result of this heterogeneity, some agents who enter period 1 would have
been working in the previous period and some would not. I will be interested in calculating
the eﬀects of (1) an increase in the wage w and (2) a reduction in unearned income y on labor
supply in period 1. Since both of these changeso n l yi n c r e a s et h ei n c e n t i v et ow o r k ,a g e n t s
who were already working prior to this change will not change labor supply.25 Hence, it is
suﬃcient to focus on the set of agents who were not working prior to these unanticipated
perturbations.
To begin, assume that all individuals would move if they were to start working, i.e.
S<T (y + w).26 Under this assumption, an agent will begin working in period 1 iﬀ
ψ < b ψ(y,w) ≡ v(T(y + w) − kh0) − v(Ty) (4)
24Using data on consumption choices when employment is stochastic, Chetty (2003a) shows that relaxing
this assumption changes the estimate of γ by at most 0.25 for plausible values of the complementarity
parameter. In the interest of space, I consider only the ucl =0case in this paper.
25An interesting feature of the commitments model is that wage increases and decreases need not have
eﬀects of the same magnitude. The left and right derivatives of the labor supply function need not be equal
because the non-convex adjustment cost makes the marginal agent who responds to a wage increase diﬀer
from the marginal agent who responds to a wage decrease. To compute curvature, we need to focus on
the same set of marginal agents — this is why I consider the eﬀects of an increase in w and a decrease in
y. However, in the empirical implementation, I do not distinguish between decreases and increases because
existing studies of labor supply have not documented systematic asymmetries in labor supply elasticities.
26Although individuals may not literally move out of their homes, they may buy a new car or new furniture
using their higher incomes. In the two good model, h should be interpreted as an aggregate of all these
types of consumption.
21where b ψ(y,w) is the disutility of labor for the agent who is indiﬀerent between working and
not working at wage w and unearned income y. The fraction of agents who will begin





where f(ψ) denotes the distribution of disutility of labor among agents who were not working




= f(b ψ)vW(T(y + w) − kh0) (6)












vW(T(y + w) − kh0) − vW(Ty)
vW(T(y + w) − kh0)
(8)
This expression captures the connection between labor supply and risk aversion that drives
the empirical strategy of this paper. It shows that the percent change in marginal utility
of wealth from Ty to T(y + w) − kh0 i se q u a lt ot h er a t i oo ft h ei n c o m ea n dw a g ee ﬀects
on labor supply. The intuition for this relationship can be seen by considering two extreme
cases. If agents are risk neutral, the marginal utility of wealth is constant, and the level
of unearned income would not aﬀect labor supply decisions; in this case, we would observe
∂θ
∂y =0 . At the other extreme, if agents are very risk averse, utility is very curved, and a
small reduction in unearned income creates a strong incentive to start working, resulting in a
22l a r g ei n c o m ee ﬀect. More generally, the degree of risk aversion is directly related to the size
of the income elasticity. Since the income eﬀect confounds risk aversion with the density of
disutility of labor f(b ψ),w em u s tn o r m a l i z ei tb yt h ew a g ee ﬀect to infer the shape of utility
over wealth.
Since the marginal utilities being compared in (8) are at points where the agent has
fully optimized consumption over food and housing, this experiment informs us about the
global curvature of utility over wealth. Translating (8) into a formula for the more familiar
coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion γg = −
vWW
vW W is a straightforward algebraic exercise. Let
l denote the overall fraction of agents working in period 1 (including those who were already

















where εl,y denotes the elasticity of labor supply with respect to unearned income and εl,w
the elasticity of labor supply with respect to the wage. With this notation, assuming that
the agent has CRRA utility over wealth when he does not have commitments, it is shown in












This estimator applies when all of the agents sell their homes after they decide to start
27The functional form assumption is necessary because we are making an inference about second derivative
properties of utility from a discrete change in wealth. CRRA utility over wealth is obtained when u(h,f)
is homothetic. If u is not homothetic, γg can be interpreted as the best-arc-ﬁt (CRRA) utility function for
the diﬀerence in marginal utility of wealth when the agent is working and not working. Loosely speaking,
γg, is the “average” coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion over this range, and b γ
g g i v e sa nu p p e rb o u n df o rt h i s
average.
23working. In the more general case in which there is heterogeneity in the upper wealth cutoﬀ
for moving, S, the estimator b γ
g is an average of the risk aversions of all the agents who
change their labor supply.28 Letting γl(W) denote the (local) coeﬃcient of relative risk
aversion for the agents who do not move, we know that γl > γg from Proposition 1. Hence,
when some agents do not drop their commitments, there is a weight π ∈ [0,1] such that
b γ




It follows that when some agents move in response to the perturbations in y and w and
others do not, the estimator b γ
g gives an upper bound for true global curvature, γg.
Chetty (2003a) implements the estimator in (9) and a similar formula for intensive la-
bor supply responses using a diverse set of wage and income elasticities from the existing
literature on labor supply.29 The measures of labor supply include hours worked, participa-
tion, and earned income. The source of identiﬁcation for these elasticities includes welfare
reforms, tax changes, cross-sectional variation, and large lottery payouts. Importantly, the
labor supply changes induced by these variations tend to result in large, long-term changes in
income. Agents are likely to move out of their (s,S) bands when their adjustments in labor
supply induce signiﬁcant shifts in lifetime wealth. Consequently, the curvature estimate
derived from these “static” labor supply elasticities is likely to tightly bound the true global
curvature of utility, γg.30
28See Chetty (2003a) for a proof.
29Since he is considering a one-good world, Chetty’s estimates eﬀectively assume k =0 . However, a
simple calibration shows that accounting for the eﬀect of the adjustment cost does not aﬀect the estimates
of γg much. Recalling that h denotes the ﬂow of services from a house, suppose the adjustment cost is 10%
of the house’s value, Th.T h e n kh =0 .1Th ⇒ k/T =0 .1. Suppose the agent has committed 50% of his
income prior to period 1, so h =0 .5y. Then the mean estimate of γg rises from 1 to 1.02. The insensitivity
comes from the fact that the adjustment cost is small relative to the change in lifetime wealth.
30One may be concerned that intensive labor supply responses will not create a suﬃcient change in income
24Chetty ﬁnds an (unweighted) mean estimate from the static labor supply literature of
b γ
g ≈ 1. In addition, he gives a calibration argument showing that if the uncompensated
labor supply curve is upward sloping (as almost all studies of labor supply ﬁnd), b γ
g < 1.25.
The intuition for this argument is simple: if the uncompensated labor supply is upward
sloping, the Slutsky equation bounds the magnitude of the income elasticity relative to the
wage elasticity. Since the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion depends on the ratio of these
two elasticities, the fact that the labor supply curve is upward sloping eﬀectively places an
upper bound on the curvature of utility.
In summary, permanent, large increases in income do not appear to reduce labor supply
much, implying that the taste for consumption deteriorates slowly with wealth when agents
are able to change commitments. In other words, utility is not very curved globally.
2.2 Estimation of Local Curvature
In analogy with the method used to ascertain γg, local risk aversion can be inferred from the
labor supply behavior of a group of agents who experience small wage and unearned income
ﬂuctuations. One such group is individuals who experience short spells of unemployment.31
These agents stochastically choose labor supply by deciding how intensely to search for a job.
to cause agents to drop their commitments. In this case, using intensive labor supply responses could reduce
π and bias the curvature estimate upward, toward γl. In practice, this problem is mitigated by the fact
that most labor supply changes, even on the intensive margin, tend to be lumpy — individuals work an extra
day of the week when their wage rises, not an extra hour. Interestingly, Chetty (2003a) estimates γ =1
when labor supply is measured by hours worked versus γ =0 .3 when using participation elasticities. This
is consistent with the commitments model.
31This group may not be representative of the general population. However, if anything, agents who
experience unemployment should be less risk averse than the typical person, insofar as they selected into an
occupation with greater risk of unemployment. This eﬀect would only bias the estimate of local curvature
downward from the population mean. Moreover, the calibration argument used to bound γg applies equally
well to agents who experience unemployment as it does to the general population; consequently, selection
b i a si n t ot h es a m p l eo fU Ir e c i p i e n t sc a n n o tb ed r i v i n gt h er e s u l t s .
25The eﬀects of unearned income and changes in wage rates on search behavior allow us to infer
the curvature of their underlying indirect utility function. Since evidence from Gruber (1998)
indicates that most individuals retain commitments during short unemployment spells, the
curvature estimate from these elasticties will approximate γl.32 The key intuition is that if
unemployment durations — which are a function of search intensity — are more responsive to
unearned income than wages, local risk aversion must be high. Variation in unemployment
i n s u r a n c el a w sa c r o s ss t a t e sa n dt i m ep r o v i d et h en e e d e dv a r i a t i o ni ne ﬀective wages and
unearned income.
Unlike in the case of global risk aversion, an analytical relationship between unemploy-
ment duration elasticities and the local curvature of utility cannot be obtained, because
no closed-form solution exists for an unemployed agent’s dynamic optimization problem.
I therefore estimate local curvature using a structural job search model that accounts for
dynamic behavioral responses. As the structural model involves several restrictive assump-
tions, I ﬁrst build intuition for the identiﬁcation strategy by describing the UI law variation
and summarizing the reduced-form results of Chetty (2003b).
2.2.1 Unemployment Insurance Laws
Figure 2 illustrates the variation in UI laws by graphing potential beneﬁtp a t h sf o rt h r e e
claimants earning $400 per week in diﬀerent states. The variation in these laws provides
identiﬁcation through two sources.33 First, weekly beneﬁtl e v e l sv a r ys i g n i ﬁcantly within the
sample. Second, the path of beneﬁts also varies: some states have a waiting week that must
32If some agents do abandon commitments during unemployment spells, the estimate of curvature using
this method will be a lower bound for γl.
33The same variation in UI laws has previously been used to estimate the eﬀects of unemployment beneﬁt
generosity on unemployment exit rates (Meyer, 1990), spousal labor supply (Cullen and Gruber, 2000),
precautionary saving (Engen and Gruber, 1995), and consumption smoothing (Gruber, 1997).
26be served before beneﬁts are received. In addition, among the states with waiting weeks,
some have a “retroactive date” after which the payment for the waiting week is returned.
To identify local curvature, we must estimate the relative importance of income and
price eﬀects in determining the length of unemployment durations. This can be done in
two ways. First, we can exploit variations in waiting weeks and retroactive dates. After
the ﬁrst week of unemployment has passed, claimants in states without waiting weeks have
eﬀectively received a temporary lump-sum grant relative to claimants in states with waiting
weeks. By comparing unemployment exit rates in the two groups of states, we can identify
the eﬀect of unearned income on search behavior.34
The second method of decomposing the beneﬁt elasticity is to exploit the ﬁnite duration
of UI beneﬁts. To see how this works, compare the search behavior of identical claimants
earning $400 in Massachusetts and California at several points during an unemployment
spell. In MA, the claimant receives approximately $250 per week for up to 26 weeks; in CA,
he receives $150 per week. Let us ﬁrst focus on individuals who have already exhausted their
UI beneﬁts. Massachusetts residents who have exhausted their beneﬁts have accumulated
$2600 more in beneﬁts than their counterparts in California. Since there are no subsequent
diﬀerences in UI payments, the higher UI beneﬁts paid to those in MA can only aﬀect
search behavior after week 26 via the income eﬀect. Now consider the week prior to beneﬁt
exhaustion. Here, higher UI beneﬁts not only raise unearned income but also decrease the
net-of-UI wage by $100 in the next week. As a result, in week 25, MA residents have less
incentive to search not only because they have more unearned income, but also because
34It may be puzzling that a small change in UI beneﬁt sc o u l dh a v ea ni n c o m ee ﬀect because the resulting
change in lifetime income is trivial. The reason that temporary income ﬂuctuations have an eﬀect is that
the unemployed tend to have very limited liquid assets and are likely to be credit constrained. For instance,
Gruber (1997) shows that food consumption during unemployment is highly responsive to the level of UI
beneﬁts, conﬁrming that small, transitory income variations do have substantial eﬀects on behavior.
27they have a lower eﬀective wage (net of UI beneﬁts). Finally, consider the ﬁrst week of an
unemployment spell. At this point, MA residents have a lower eﬀective wage for the next
26 weeks but have not yet accumulated more unearned income than those in CA. Higher
UI beneﬁts aﬀect behavior primarily through the price channel at the beginning of the spell.
Hence, if an increase in UI beneﬁts reduces the hazard rate much more early in a spell than
later in a spell, the price eﬀect must be of greater importance than the income eﬀect. But if
higher UI beneﬁts continue to reduce hazard rates late into an unemployment spell, income
eﬀects must be important and, based on the logic above, utility must be highly curved
locally.35
It is important to observe that a standard loss aversion model does not predict a high value
for γl when it is estimated from variations in UI beneﬁts. If the agent is loss averse and uses
pre-unemployment consumption as a reference, the curvature of the value function is being
estimated from variations in income that are strictly below his kink. In a more sophisticated
model where the reference point moves along with the individual’s consumption, the only
way in which loss aversion itself could generate a high estimate of γl is if we happen to “pass
through” the kink at the reference when we vary income and estimate the change in marginal
utility. However, there is obviously no positioning of one kink that could generate a high
estimate of curvature between three or more unique points on the utility function. Since
there are several UI beneﬁt levels in the data, our estimate of γl is eﬀectively identiﬁed from
observing changes in marginal utility across many diﬀerent income levels. Consequently,
this method would not yield a high estimate of γl if agents were simply loss averse and
commitments had no impact on risk preferences.
35A dynamic model of search is necessary because we need to take into account the fact that Michigan
residents anticipate having higher unearned income while unemployed even at the beginning of the spell;
using cumulative UI beneﬁts as a measure of unearned income at a given point in the spell is therefore
inappropriate.
282.2.2 Data
The data used in this study are from the 1985-1987 and 1990-1996 panels of the Survey
of Income and Program Participation. I make four exclusions on the original sample of
job leavers to arrive at my ﬁnal sample. First, following previous studies of UI, I restrict
attention to prime-age males (over 18 and under 65). Second, I include only the set of
individuals who report searching for a job at some point after losing their job, in order to
eliminate individuals who have dropped out of the labor force from the analysis. Third,
individuals who report that they were on temporary layoﬀ at any point during their spells
are dropped, since they might not have been actively searching for a job. Finally, I exclude
individuals who have less than three months work history within the survey because there
is insuﬃcient information to estimate pre-unemployment wages for this group.
The core sample used in the analysis is the remaining set of 4,457 individuals who report
receiving UI beneﬁts in the month they became unemployed. I focus on individuals who
take up UI within one month because I do not model the takeup decision, assuming instead
that all individuals receive UI beneﬁts upon unemployment. The model therefore applies
most directly to those who actually begin receiving beneﬁts shortly after unemployment.36
Since computational constraints limit the extent of heterogeneity that can be incorporated
into the structural model, I use published state average beneﬁts instead of each individual’s
actual UI beneﬁt amount, assuming that there is a “representative agent” in each state/year
pair. This limitation is likely to be inconsequential for the results, since reduced-form results
are similar when each individual’s simulated UI beneﬁt level is used instead.
T a b l e2g i v e ss u m m a r ys t a t i s t i c sf o rt h eﬁrst-month UI claimants. The median UI
36Nonetheless, inclusion of the additional 2,409 UI recipients who do not take up UI in the ﬁrst month
does not aﬀect the results.
29recipient is a high school graduate and has pre-UI gross annual earnings of $20,726 in 1990
dollars. Most claimants have limited ﬁnancial assets before their unemployment spells begin:
median liquid wealth net of unsecured debt is only $186. As in the general population, wealth
inequality is extremely high in this group.
The mean weekly beneﬁt amount is $168, and there is considerable cross-state variation
in unemployment beneﬁts, from an average weekly beneﬁt amount of $102 in Louisiana
to $217 in Massachusetts in 1990.37 Fifteen percent of the UI claimants began receiving
beneﬁts immediately upon unemployment (i.e. did not have a waiting week), while another
16% received a retroactive payment for the waiting week after their spell extended past a
certain length (typically 4 weeks). Hence, there is a large amount of variation in the key
aspects of the laws.
2.2.3 Overview of Reduced-Form Results
This section brieﬂy reviews the results of Chetty (2003b), who estimates hazard models
using the data described above to infer the relative magnitude of price and income eﬀects
in unemployment durations. The reduced-form approach serves two purposes. First, its
transparency helps clarify the variation that is identifying the structural model. This should
comfort readers who are concerned about the detailed assumptions required to estimate the
search model. Second, the reduced-form evidence shows that the inclusion of covariates does
not aﬀect the estimates of the key income and price elasticities. This is reassuring because
computational limits prevent the inclusion of many covariates in the structural estimation.
The key results can be summarized using graphs of Kaplan-Meier survival curves, which
show the fraction of agents who remain unemployed t weeks after job loss. Let us ﬁrst divide
37Although some of this variation is due to diﬀerences in average wages across states, most of it is the
result of diﬀerences in the UI laws themselves.
30states into two categories: those that have average weekly beneﬁta m o u n t sa b o v et h em e a n
and those below the mean. Figure 3 shows that individuals who receive more beneﬁts have a
lower job-ﬁnding hazard rate throughout the spell, since the two survival curves do not begin
to converge.38 Estimates of Cox survival models reveal that the coeﬃcient on the interaction
between weeks unemployed and the beneﬁt rate is statistically and economically insigniﬁcant,
indicating that UI beneﬁts continue to reduce search eﬀo r te v e nl a t ei na nu n e m p l o y m e n t
spell. In addition, the interaction between the beneﬁt exhaustion dummy and beneﬁtr a t e
is also insigniﬁcant, implying that UI continues to distort behavior even after beneﬁts have
ended. As emphasized above, these results indicate that UI aﬀects search eﬀort primarily
via an income eﬀect rather than a price eﬀect. If the reduction in the net-of-UI wage were
the primary source of changes in search behavior, higher beneﬁts would reduce search eﬀort
much more at the beginning of a spell than in later weeks, and would have very little eﬀect
after beneﬁts are exhausted.
Let us now divide states into two diﬀerent categories: those that have a waiting week and
no retroactive payment and those that have either no waiting week or make a retroactive
payment for the waiting week at a later date.39 Claimants in the latter set of states (INC
=1 ) get an extra week of beneﬁts up front relative to claimants in the former group (INC
=0 ). Note that the total weeks of beneﬁts that both claimants can get remains the same;
it is just that the individual in the INC = 1 state has one week of beneﬁts shifted from
the end to the beginning. If income eﬀects are important, this shift of income should have
a short-lived but noticeable eﬀect of the probability of survival. Figure 4 shows that this
38The hazard rate at week t is the probability that a spell ends in week t conditional on it lasting for at
least t periods. That is, ht =P r ( dur = t|dur >= t).
39The states that make a retroactive payment for the waiting week are placed in the INC =1category
because claimants in all of these states have an extra week of beneﬁts after the retroactive date has passed.
Of course, before the retroactive date, these claimants do not have a higher level of unearned income. This
problem is resolved in the dynamic structural model estimated below.
31is indeed the case: Individuals in the INC = 1 states have signiﬁcantly lower job-ﬁnding
hazards in the ﬁrst two months after unemployment, but begin to catch up to the other
states in subsequent weeks. Correspondingly, the hazard model estimates indicate that the
hazard rates of the INC = 1 group deﬁned above are noticeably lower in the ﬁrst two months
and higher in the third month of unemployment. The fact that a small lump-sum grant has
non-trivial eﬀects on search behavior again points to the importance of income eﬀects for
these committed agents, which as noted above implies high γl.
All of the preceding results are robust to the inclusion of controls such as a ten-piece
spline for wage, age, education, marital status, the state unemployment rate, and industry,
occupation, year, and month dummies. In addition, the inclusion of state ﬁxed eﬀects does
not aﬀect the results.
Under the restrictive assumption that agents choose search eﬀort in each month of their
unemployment spell without considering implications for future consumption or employment
(e.g., because of binding credit constraints), Chetty (2003b) shows that these reduced-form
estimates imply γl =8 . Before proceeding to estimate γl in a more general setting using
a dynamic search model, I address two potential biases that could potentially aﬀect the
analysis. First, is the variation in UI laws across states and time correlated with unobserved
heterogeneity that aﬀects unemployment durations? One way of conﬁrming that the UI laws
are causal is to check whether the income and price eﬀects do not emerge for individuals who
do not get UI. Indeed, the point estimates for this “control” group are close to zero, and
the 95% conﬁdence intervals do not include the point estimates of the income and beneﬁts
elasticities for the UI claimants.
Second, is there selection with respect to the UI law? Evidence from Chetty (2003b)
suggests that selection bias is minor, and if at all works against ﬁnding a high estimate
32of local curvature. Waiting periods have no eﬀect on UI takeup rates, and selection with
respect to the level of UI beneﬁts is suﬃciently small that any bias in the estimated hazard
rates is dwarfed by the standard errors. A deeper concern is that selection occurs over the
unemployment spell, i.e., the pool of agents who remain unemployed after several weeks is
diﬀe r e n ti ns t a t e sw i t hl o wv s .h i g hU Ib e n e ﬁts. Fortunately, selection bias of this type is
likely to work against ﬁnding an estimate of high local curvature. Higher-skilled agents are
more likely to remain unemployed for a long time in high-beneﬁts t a t e sr e l a t i v et ol o wb e n e ﬁt
states. Since more skilled agents have higher unemployment exit hazards, this selection eﬀect
should push the hazards in high-beneﬁt states up relative to the hazards in low-beneﬁts t a t e s
as the spell elapses. This eﬀect makes us understate the extent to which UI beneﬁts reduce
hazard rates late in an unemployment spell. Based on our identiﬁcation strategy for the
income eﬀect, it follows that this would only cause us to underestimate the size of the income
eﬀect relative to the price eﬀect, and thereby underestimate local curvature.
3 Structural Estimation of Local Risk Aversion
3.1 Dynamic Search Model
The structural estimation procedure implemented below involves three steps: (1) compute
each agent’s optimal unemployment exit hazards using a search model, given the UI law he
faces and a set of core preference parameters, ω that includes the key γl parameter; (2) use
these hazards to compute the likelihood of observing a given set of unemployment durations
for a given value of ω; and (3) estimate ω by maximizing the likelihood function.40
40Several studies have estimated structural parameters of job search models. Wolpin (1987) structurally
estimates parameters of the wage oﬀer distribution and the reservation wage. More recently, Paserman (2002)
estimates hyperbolic preference parameters for unemployed agents. Existing structural models assume
33In canonical job search models, agents either choose a reservation wage or search eﬀort
in each period.41 I adopt the latter strategy primarily because it reduces the computational
intensity of the search problem in a manner that will be made clear shortly. This assumption
does have some empirical basis: Wolpin (1987) and van den Berg (1990) ﬁnd that reservation
wages are very low and that job oﬀers are accepted with a probability close to 1. This
suggests that the primary disincentive eﬀects of UI occur through a reduction of search
intensity for job oﬀers, rather than rejection of a larger fraction of oﬀers after they are
obtained.
I ﬁrst outline the main features of the model, postponing discussion of the speciﬁc para-
metric assumptions that are made until the next section. I consider a discrete-time setting
in which each period corresponds to one week, since unemployment duration data is available
only at a weekly frequency. All dates that follow refer to time elapsed since the beginning
of an unemployment spell and not to calendar time.
(a) Consumption. The agent has an inﬁnite horizon and becomes unemployed exoge-
nously with initial assets a0 at time 0. Following a job separation, in each week t, he chooses
food consumption, ft, and housing consumption, ht. Assume that agents do not abandon
their commitments while searching for a new job. This simpliﬁes the consumption decision
to choosing ft in each period.42 Since ht is ﬁxed at h throughout the search process, the
housing argument of agent’s utility is suppressed and utility is denoted by u(ft) when the
meaning is not ambiguous. The key parameter to be estimated is the curvature γf =
−uff
uf f,
a linear utility function and therefore do not identify the curvature of utility. The introduction of a
curved utility greatly complicates the estimation procedure because it makes the search problem analytically
intractable.
41Lippman and McCall (1979) and Atkinson and Micklewright (1991) reviews the theory and empirics of
the job search literature.
42As noted above, if some agents do move out of their houses during unemployment spells, the estimate
of local curvature will be biased downward.
34which can be translated into γl using (3).
The agent has a time discount factor β and savings earn a net interest rate r = 1
β − 1.
I model credit constraints by assuming that the agent can borrow up to a ﬁxed amount B.
Letting bt denote unemployment beneﬁts in week t of the spell, the worker’s intertemporal
budget constraint is
at+1 =( 1+r)(at + bt − h − ft) (11)
The {bt} paths are heterogeneous across agents; it is the variation in UI beneﬁtp a t h st h a t
allows us to estimate the agent’s utility function.
(b) Job Search. While unemployed, the agent chooses a level of search eﬀort et in each
week to ﬁnd a new job. Once the agent ﬁnds a job, it is permanent, and pays a wage of w
per week. The disutility of working is denoted by ψ.
Higher search eﬀort translates directly into a higher probability of ﬁnding a job: the
probability of ﬁn d i n gaj o bi np e r i o dt is
pt = αtet (12)
The αt parameters can be interpreted as the “baseline” probabilities of ﬁn d i n gaj o bi n
week t of an unemployment spell when one exerts 1 unit of search eﬀort. These parameters
are allowed to vary over time to capture the ﬂuctuations in unemployment exit hazards over
time. In addition, the αt parameters depend on local economic conditions, as reﬂected by
the state unemployment rate when an individual loses his job.
Search is costly: the agent incurs a disutility of c(e) by expending e units of search eﬀort.
Assume that c is twice diﬀerentiable and convex.
Since our estimates of local curvature are identiﬁed by variations in short-run search be-
35havior, a ﬁnite search horizon of T =5 5weeks is imposed on the model. This is a reasonable
assumption since job ﬁnding hazards are quite low after one year of unemployment in prac-
tice. If an individual reaches week T +1without ﬁnding a job, he receives a ﬁxed welfare
payment for the remainder of his life. In addition, I assume that the agent abandons his
commitments in week T +1, reoptimizing and choosing a new value of housing consumption
after this point. Since the agent’s problem is stationary after week T, a closed-form solution
for the value function at T +1can be obtained.
(c) Agent Optimization. The agent’s problem can be solved using dynamic programming.
There are two state variables: assets and the employment state.
I ﬁrst characterize optimal behavior in the employed state, where the agent faces a
stationary eat-the-pie problem without uncertainty. This problem has a simple solution:
the agent consumes a constant fraction of his lifetime wealth in all subsequent periods. If
the agent has assets at and begins working in week t,h ec o n s u m e s
f
e
t = rat + w − h
per week for the rest of his life. This implies that the agent’s value function when employed






{u(rat + w − h) − ψ} (13)
Let us now analyze the unemployed state. While unemployed, the value function in periods
t ∈ {1,...,T} is
V
u







36When utility is nonlinear, the Bellman equation in (14) does not have an analytical
solution. Given functional form assumptions on u and c, the sequence {V u
t (at)}T
t=1 can be
obtained by starting with the value function in the terminal period, VT+1(aT+1), and using
numerical backwards induction to solve the system in (14). The terminal value function
VT+1(aT+1), which gives the value of going on welfare with assets aT+1, can be computed as
follows. First, observe that in week T +1 , the agent faces another stationary eat-the-pie
consumption problem, and again consumes a constant fraction of his wealth for the remainder
of his life. By assumption the agent will sell his house and incur the ﬁxed transaction cost.
Let w denote the agent’s weekly welfare payment net of (annuitized) transaction costs after
period T. Optimal housing consumption after this point, hw, can be computed by solving a







u(hw(aT+1),w − hw(aT+1)) (15)
Given VT+1, solving the dynamic programming problem requires optimization over both
eﬀort and consumption in each week t for every level of assets at w i t hw h i c ho n ec o u l de n t e r
week t. This two-dimensional optimization problem can be reduced to a one-dimensional
search for the optimal consumption path when unemployed, {fu
t }, by deriving an analytic
expression for et(at) in terms of fu
t a n dt h ev a l u ef u n c t i o n sa tt i m et +1 , V e
t+1(at+1) and
V u
t+1(at+1).S i n c e c(e) is convex, V u
t (at) is concave in et and the optimal eﬀort level is given







By choosing a tractable functional form for c(e), we can directly calculate the optimal eﬀort
37level at time t for a given level of at and ft, after we have computed the value functions at
time t +1 . This analytic simpliﬁcation tremendously increases the speed of the algorithm,
and is the beneﬁt of formulating the model in terms of search eﬀort rather than reservation
wages.




Given values of {w,w,B,h,{bt}
T−1
t=1 } and the initial asset level a0, solving the dynamic pro-




t=1 for an agent in terms of the core
parameters ω. Indexing the individuals in the sample by i =1 ,...,I,w ec a ns o l v et h em o d e l
I t i m e st oo b t a i na no p t i m a ls e a r c he ﬀort path {ei
t}
T−1
t=1 for each agent. The ith agent’s








(d) Likelihood Function.43 The likelihood of observing a given dataset of unemployment
durations for a core parameter vector ω can be directly computed from the exit probabilities
that come out of the search model. Suppose individual i has an unemployment duration of
di weeks. The probability of this event is the product of the probability that the individual









Suppose the ﬁrst I1 individuals have uncensored spells and the remaining I2 individuals have
43Kiefer (1988) provides a review of maximum likelihood estimation of survival models.














The structural parameters of the search model, including local curvature, can be estimated
by maximizing the likelihood in (17) if one can observe true unemployment durations. Un-
fortunately, this is not possible in practice: There is an important mismeasurement problem
in the SIPP data known as the “seam eﬀect.” To see how this reporting problem emerges,
note that the data is collected by interviewing individuals every four months about their
activities during the past four months, which is termed the “reference period.” Individuals
tend to repeat answers about weekly job status. As a result, the probability of reporting
a transition to employment is six times larger on the seam than within reference periods.
Consequently, many spells of unemployment appear to last for exactly the length of one or
two reference periods, which correspond to lengths of 17 and 35 weeks.
To account for this mismeasurement problem, I test the robustness of the results by
explicitly modelling and estimating the process that generates the reporting errors. In
particular, I consider a mixture model with two types of individuals: exact reporters, who
always report the truth, and seam reporters, who always report job-ﬁnding on the nearest
seam. I then estimate the fraction of seam reporters, µ, along with the core parameters of
the search model. It turns out that the estimate of local curvature is unaﬀected by this
correction for measurement error. A full description of the model of recall errors is given in
the appendix.
393.2 Estimation Details








T h ek e yp a r a m e t e rf o ro u ra n a l y s i si sγf. The nuisance parameters γh (curvature of utility
over housing) and η (relative weight placed on housing in utility) cannot be identiﬁed from
data on unemployment durations. However, these two parameters can be expressed in
terms of γf,h,a n dt h eg l o b a lc o e ﬃcient of relative risk aversion γg =1estimated in Chetty
(2003a). In other words, {γf,η,γh} is homeomorphic to {γf,h,γg}.S i n c e b o t h γl(W) and
γg(W) vary with W under this speciﬁcation of u(h,f), I will assume that γg(W0)=1at the
a g e n t ’ sp r e - u n e m p l o y m e n tw e a l t hW0 and report estimates of γl(W0) a tt h es a m ep o i n tf o r
comparison.
I also assume a power speciﬁcation for the cost of eﬀort:




This parametrization assumes that the elasticity of cost of eﬀort with respect to eﬀort is
constant: εc,e = θ. The multiplicative scalar [u(h,w) − u(h,w − 150)] is included to aid in
the interpretation of the estimates of the baseline job-ﬁnding probabilities {αt}
T−1
t=1 .W i t h
this choice of units, the cost of one unit of eﬀort is normalized as the welfare cost of losing
$150 of food per week.
Similarly, to aid in the interpretation of the disutility of labor parameter ψ,Id e ﬁne
ψ = u(h,w − h) − u(h,w − h − ψ$) (20)
40and report the estimate of ψ$, which can be interpreted as the disutility of labor expressed
in dollars of food consumption lost from the initial level.
To reduce the parameter set, I replace the nonparametric speciﬁcation of the baseline
job-ﬁnding probabilities {αt}
T−1
t=1 with a piecewise linear functional form. Monthly break
points are included in the linear spline for the α parameters for the ﬁrst ﬁve months and
breaks every two months are included for the remainder of the search horizon:
S = {1,5,9,13,17,25,32,40,48,55}
I include more breaks early in the spell since weekly ﬂuctuations in job search productivity
are likely to diminish as a spell wears on. The values of αt in the other weeks are obtained
by linearly interpolating between the break points. I check that the speciﬁcation of {αt}
is suﬃciently ﬂexible by showing that the inclusion of additional pieces in the linear spline
(expansion of S)d o e sn o ta ﬀect the estimates of the key parameters.
The scale of the αt parameters depends on the state unemployment rate when individual
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where unempdevi denotes the deviation in the state unemployment rate when agent i be-
comes unemployed from the overall mean in the sample.
With this notation, the set of parameters to be estimated in the structural model is
reduced to:
e ω = {γf,θ,ψ$,{αt}t∈S,a u}
41The remaining parameters {h,w,B,β} are speciﬁed exogenously. The estimation algo-
rithm is run for diﬀerent values of these parameters to check sensitivity. Since CPU time
increases linearly in the number of dynamic programming problems solved, I eliminate in-
dividual heterogeneity and estimate a representative agent model in which each agent earns
the mean wage in the sample gets the mean weekly beneﬁt amount for his (state,year) pair.
As noted above, the reduced-form estimates remain similar when individual beneﬁts are
replaced with state-year averages, justifying this simpliﬁcation.
3.3 Parameter Estimates
Table 3 reports estimates of the search model. I begin by discussing a benchmark speci-
ﬁcation in detail, and then turn to robustness checks. In speciﬁcation (1), which includes
the measurement-error correction, the weekly wage is ﬁxed at the sample mean w =4 0 0 .I
assume that agents have committed h =2 0 0of their budgets to housing prior to unemploy-
ment, and that they have pre-unemployment assets of a =5 0 0 .I ﬁx β =0 .91/50 to reﬂect a
yearly discount rate of 10%. The welfare payment after week 55 is set at w = 100.T h e s e
values are roughly in correspondence with the average values in the data and prior empirical
estimates.
It is more diﬃcult to specify the borrowing constraint because of the lack of data on
this parameter. Intuitively, B reﬂects both the ability to make late payments on the
commitments and actual borrowing channels such as credit cards. To gauge the direction
of the bias from misspeciﬁcation of B,n o t et h a tal o w e rl e v e lo fB raises the percentage
change in consumption associated with an increase in UI beneﬁts,
∆f
f . If the agent faced
very tight borrowing constraints, an extra dollar of UI would be used to raise consumption
rather than to reduce borrowing. Next, observe that the change in search eﬀort in response
42to a change in unearned income depends on the product of γl with
∆f
f —t h el a r g e rt h ed r o p
in consumption, the more the incentive to start searching harder. Generating a search eﬀort
response of a given magnitude with a larger
∆f
f requires a smaller γl. Hence, underestimating
B will bias us toward overestimating
∆f
f and underestimating γl,m a k i n gi th a r d e rt oﬁnd
evidence in favor of the model.
We can evaluate whether B is underestimated by checking if the mean consumption drop
generated by the model is larger than what is observed empirically. If the predicted drop is
larger than the observed, the borrowing constraint in the model must be tighter than what
unemployed individuals actually face. Gruber (1997) estimates that the average drop in food
consumption is 10% at the mean UI beneﬁt level. I therefore try to err on the conservative
side and set B =1 1 ,000 in the benchmark speciﬁcation, which implies an average food
consumption drop of approximately 20% during unemployment.44
Given these values for the exogenous parameters, the maximum likelihood estimate of
the key local curvature parameter, γl,i s7.37 and the standard error is 2.07.45 We can
conﬁdently reject the null hypothesis that commitments do not aﬀe c tt h ec u r v a t u r eo fu t i l i t y
(γl = γg < 1.25).
The estimates of the other parameters in the model appear reasonable. The estimate
of θ = εc,e =1 .54 indicates that a 10% increase in eﬀort results in a 15% increase in the
disutility of search. The disutility of labor is estimated as equivalent to losing $72.50 of food
consumption per week starting at an initial value of $200. The estimates of the baseline job
ﬁnding probabilities show that exerting one unit of search eﬀort, which costs the equivalent
44Since the likelihood in (17) is only a function of unemployment durations, this consumption data cannot
be used to estimate B within the maximum likelihood procedure.
45Standard errors are obtained by inverting a maximum likelihood ratio test, i.e. constructing an interval
such that the null hypothesis that the parameter lies outside this interval can be rejected with a given p
value. The more common method of inverting the asymptotic information matrix could not be applied here
because of problems in computing second derivatives numerically.
43of losing $150 of food, results in a 3-4% chance of ﬁnding a job in each week during the
ﬁrst six months after unemployment. Since losing $150 of food has signiﬁcant welfare costs,
these estimates suggest that the job search process is quite unpleasant. The estimate of
αu indicates that a 1 percentage point increase in the state unemployment rate lowers the
job ﬁnding hazard by approximately 5%. It is reassuring that the structural estimate of
the state unemployment rate coeﬃcient almost exactly matches the reduced-form estimate
of this coeﬃcient reported in Chetty (2003b). Finally, the estimate of µ =0 .33 indicates
that approximately one third of the individuals in the sample are seam reporters who do not
accurately report job transitions within a reference period.
I now turn to the results of some sensitivity checks. In speciﬁcation (2), I estimate the
model without including the measurement error correction by maximizing the likelihood for
true durations in (17). The point estimate of γl remains similar, but the standard error of
the estimate rises. The bunching of unemployment durations at 17 weeks is picked up by
t h es p i k ei nt h eb a s e l i n eh a z a r di nw e e k1 7( α17). Speciﬁcation (3) replicates speciﬁcation
(1) but reduces the number of break points in the speciﬁcation of the baseline hazards.
The estimate of γl remains virtually unchanged. This suggests that the speciﬁcation of
the baseline job-ﬁnding probabilities is suﬃciently ﬂexible that the key curvature parameter
is being identiﬁed only from cross-sectional variations and not the overall time-pattern of
unemployment exit rates. Finally, in speciﬁcation (4), I check the sensitivity of γl to the value
of the borrowing constraint by setting B =1 0 ,000. As expected, this lowers the estimate
of γl, but the new point estimate of 6.15 lies well within the 95% conﬁdence interval for the
estimate in the benchmark speciﬁcation.
Is the estimate of γl being identiﬁed from the variation in income and price eﬀects created
by the UI laws, as described above? Figure 5 uses the estimates of speciﬁcation (2) to plot
44predicted survival curves for individuals in states that pay UI beneﬁts below the mean and
those that pay UI beneﬁts above the mean. The empirical survival curves for these two
categories are also shown.46 Visual assessment of the ﬁt indicates that the model captures
both the time pattern of unemployment exit rates and the cross-sectional variation due to
UI laws quite well. For comparison, Figure 6 replicates Figure 5 when γl is held ﬁxed at
2.5 while the likelihood function is maximized over all the other parameters. The predicted
survival curves using these restricted maximum likelihood estimates continue to ﬁtt h eo v e r a l l
time pattern of unemployment exit rates well; however, they fail to capture the extent to
which higher UI beneﬁts diminish search intensity late in the spell (the gap between the two
curves). Together, these two ﬁgures indicate that γl is being identiﬁed from precisely the
v a r i a t i o ni nU Il a w st h a to n ew o u l de x p e c tb a s e do nt h ei n t u i t i o ng i v e na b o v e . T h ef a c tt h a t
higher UI beneﬁts persistently reduce unemployment exit rates throughout an unemployment
spell, even after beneﬁts have been exhausted, can only be explained by a high value of γl
in the dynamic search model.
Figure 7 summarizes the empirical content of the commitments model by plotting utility
over wealth for a model without credit constraints in which the agent faces no uncertainty
after the current period. The ﬁgure assumes γl(W0)=7 .37 at the agent’s initial wealth
level W0. In this example, the agent has an annual income of $40,000, a prior commitment
of 50% of income, and faces an adjustment cost of 7.5%. Assuming a 5% interest rate and
an inﬁnite horizon, this agent’s initial lifetime wealth is W0 =$ 8 0 0 ,000. The committed
region within the (s,S) band includes roughly ±10% of lifetime wealth. Commitments
have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on risk preferences: Utility is considerably more curved locally than
46I plot predicted survival curves for speciﬁcation (2) rather than (1) because generating predictions from
the measurement error model requires that we re-create the measurement error in the empirical survival
curves. This is diﬃcult because we need to take the actual distribution of seams in the population into
account.
45it is globally, as shown by the dashed curve, which extends the utility function within the
committed region outside the (s,S) band.
4 Implications of Commitments
This paper has characterized preferences over wealth in a world with two consumption goods,
o n eo fw h i c hi n v o l v e sac o m m i t m e n ti nt h a ta na d j u s t m e n tc o s tm u s tb ep a i dw h e nt h eg o o d
is sold. In this model, utility over wealth is more curved locally than globally: individuals
are relatively more risk averse with respect to moderate-scale income ﬂuctuations than they
are to large income ﬂuctuations. Commitments also create a gambling motive.
The model was tested and calibrated using the labor-supply method of estimating risk
aversion developed in Chetty (2003a). Existing estimates of wage and income elasticities
from the static labor supply literature imply an upper bound for global curvature of 1.25.
Diﬀerences in unemployment insurance laws across states and time allow us estimate the
local curvature of utility. Reduced-form estimates of semiparametric hazard models and
structural estimates of a dynamic job search model reveal that the local coeﬃcient of relative
risk aversion is around 7. The empirical estimate of the diﬀerence between local and global
curvature comes from two facts about labor supply: (1) Permanent increases in income do
not reduce labor supply signiﬁcantly, implying that the taste for consumption deteriorates
slowly with wealth; but (2) temporary ﬂuctuations in income do cause large labor supply
responses, indicating that the marginal utility of wealth falls rapidly when substitution across
consumption goods is hindered by prior commitments.
I conclude by discussing a few empirical puzzles that commitments could help explain:
1. [Risk Aversion and Insurance] Retaining a consequentalist, expected utility framework,
46the commitments model escapes Rabin’s (1999) critique by generating a utility that
is not everywhere concave. The utility in Figure 7 rejects the 50-50 $1000/$1050 bet
but accepts the $40000/$6.35 million one. It also rationalizes the desire to insure
moderate-scale shocks through automobile and non-catastrophic health insurance.
2. [Gambling] The model explains why racetrack bettors prefer bets with long odds and
large payoﬀs (Golec and Tamarkin, 1998). It is also consistent with the ﬁnding that
higher incomes are less likely to play the lottery overall, but are relatively more likely
to participate in lotteries that have very large payoﬀs (Clotfelter and Cook, 1987).
3. [Intertemporal Substitution] Commitments can reconcile limited intertemporal substi-
tution, non-ridiculous degrees of risk aversion over large stakes, and time-separability
of utility. When utility is time-separable, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is
the reciprocal of the curvature of utility over wealth. A large fraction of intertemporal
substitution among nondurables and services is likely to occur while individuals are
maintaining commitments. Since the relevant curvature parameter for intertemporal
substitution lies between γg =1and γl ≈ 7 in this case, an EIS signiﬁcantly below 1
(as estimated e.g., by Hall (1988), Epstein-Zin (1991), and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002))
would be consistent with the risk preferences of committed agents.
4. [Wage Rigidities] Committed individuals may prefer a gamble in which they get ﬁred
with a small probability rather than take a reduction in wages with certainty. Hence,
the model can explain workers’ disdain for small wage cuts, and why ﬁrms are reluctant
to cut wages and instead choose to lay oﬀ workers, as discussed e.g., in Bewley (1999).
5. [Labor Supply] Mincer (1962) and Cullen and Gruber (2000) document a large “added
worker” eﬀect: Spouses enter the labor force when primary earners become unem-
47ployed. Commitments rationalize this behavior by making labor supply relatively
more responsive to transitory income ﬂuctuations than permanent ones.
6. [Taxation] Studies of the labor supply response to taxation ﬁnd very small tax elas-
ticities for households with incomes below $100,000 (see e.g., Gruber and Saez (2000).
The inability to fully reoptimize consumption in the short run may dampen responses
to tax reforms even if taxes are highly distortionary in the long run.
7. [Crime and Punishment] Becker (1968) showed that the optimal punishment strat-
egy for risk averse agents combines large ﬁnes with low probabilities of punishment.
However, empirical evidence indicates that extensive resources are in fact devoted to
enforcement (see e.g. Dickens et. al. (1989), who label this a “monitoring puzzle”).
Criminals with commitments may be more sensitive to the probability of apprehension
than to the severity of the punishment.
8. [Asset Pricing] Chetty and Szeidl (2003) aggregate a model of commitments and show
that when calibrated appropriately, it can explain the equity premium puzzle — why
stocks have historically had a high rate of return despite their low covariance with
consumption. Moreover, they ﬁnd that an exogenous increase in housing commitments
causes a large portfolio reallocation from stocks to bonds, as the model predicts.
9. [Optimal Unemployment Insurance] The answer to the applied question that motivated
this paper — What is the optimal level of social insurance? — changes signiﬁcantly when
commitments are taken into account. Using the same parameters as those in Gruber
(1997), the optimal replacement rate for pre-unemployment wages rises from 0 to 0.44
when commitments are incorporated into the model with the empirical utility over
48wealth estimated above.47 The optimal replacement rate for long-term shocks such as
disability may be much lower, insofar as all types of consumption get adjusted in the
long run.
47From a positive standpoint, it is interesting to note that commitments appear to be the motivation for UI.
In the Arizona State Beneﬁt Adequacy Study, Burgess et. al. (1981) deﬁne a measure of “beneﬁta d e q u a c y . ”
They emphasize that “this measure of beneﬁta d e q u a c yi sd e ﬁned for each beneﬁciary within the context
of his/her household circumstances. These circumstances are reﬂected by the total of necessary/obligated
expenses for the entire household....”
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52Appendix A: Derivation of (9)
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Appendix B: Correction for “Seam Eﬀect”
When the true unemployment durations are latent, we need to maximize a likelihood
function for reported durations rather than the likelihood for actual durations in (17). This
appendix develops a likelihood for reported durations using a mixture model to capture the
process that generates the reporting errors in the SIPP data.
Suppose that there are two types of individuals in the population: exact reporters and
seam reporters. Exact reporters always report job ﬁndings exactly on the week that they
actually occur; for this group, there is no mismeasurement problem. Seam reporters never
report job-ﬁndings within a four-month reference period; they eﬀectively report all transitions
on the seams between interviews. What remains is to specify which transitions are reported
on which seam by seam reporters. Lacking prior information on the nature of the recall
process, I make the assumption that seam reporters report job ﬁndings that occur in the ﬁrst
half of a reference period on the seam before that period and job ﬁndings in the second half of
a reference period on the seam after that period.48 For example, suppose a seam-reporting
agent has his interview seams at 17 weeks, 34 weeks, and 52 weeks after unemployment
48This pattern would emerge if seam reporters report a constant employment status during the reference
period based on whether they spent the majority of that reference period employed or unemployed.
53(recall that each reference period lasts for 17-18 weeks).49 If he ﬁnds a job between weeks 8
and 25 after unemployment, he reports the transition at week 17; if he ﬁnds a job between
26 and 43 weeks after unemployment, he reports the transition on the second seam; and
if he ﬁnds a job between week 44 and week 55, the end of the search period in the model,
he reports the transition on the third seam. Finally, if a spell ends in the ﬁr s th a l fo ft h e
ﬁrst reference period (in this example, before the ninth week), I assume that all individuals
correctly report the duration.
Given this model of recall errors, we can formulate a likelihood function for reported
d u r a t i o n sa sf o l l o w s . L e tµ denote the fraction of seam reporters. The probability of
observing a given duration d is
Pr(d)=( 1− µ)Pr(d|exact reporter)+µPr(d|seam reporter)
For exact reporters, the probability of observing d coincides with the probability that the
true duration of the spell is d. To see how the likelihood for the seam reporters is formulated,
consider an agent who reports a duration d that coincides with his ﬁrst seam. Under our
model of recall errors, we only know that the true duration lies in the second half of his
ﬁrst reference period (i.e. after d − 8)o rt h eﬁrst half of his second reference period (before
d +9 ). The probability of observing d is therefore equal to the probability that the true






























where onseami is a dummy variable that indicates whether the agent’s duration di lies on one
of his seams, seam1i denotes the week on which agent i’s ﬁrst seam occurs, and (di <seam1i−
9) is an indicator variable.
The measurement-error corrected estimator of {ω,µ} reported in the text maximizes the
likelihood function in (22).
49Note that this is not the only pattern for the seam weeks because agents can report unemployment at
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FIGURE 1
A Committed Agent’s Utility Over Wealth: Theoretical Characterization
NOTE – Figure plots utility over wealth in second period, after an agent has
purchased a home in period 1. The transaction cost of selling the home makes it
optimal not to move iff W  s,S. The commitment affects preferences over wealth
in two ways: (1) It makes agents locally risk averse by increasing the curvature of
utility within the s,S band; (2) It creates non-concavities in utility over wealth at s
and S, creating a gambling motive.
55FIGURE 2



























































Maximum Duration = 26 weeks
Pre-Unemp. Wage = $400
NOTE – Figure plots weekly unemployment insurance benefit payments in 1990
dollars for a claimant earning $400 per week over the entire year prior to
unemployment. MI has no waiting period; TX has a retroactive payment for the
waiting period after 4 weeks of unemployment; and CA has a waiting period and no
retroactive provision. Following the notation used in the paper, MI and TX are INC
 1 states and CA is an INC  0 state. For this claimant, all three states have a
maximum duration for UI benefits of 26 weeks; since CA has a one week waiting
period, benefits terminate in the 27th week after the job separation.






























d WBA above mean 
WBA below mean 
FIGURE 3
UI Benefit Rates and Empirical Survival Probabilities
NOTE – Figure plots survival probabilities for two categories of unemployment
insurance claimants: those who live in states with average weekly benefit amounts
(WBA) below the sample mean and those who live in states with WBAs above the
mean. See Table 2 for description of sample selection procedures.































INC = 1 
INC = 0 
FIGURE 4
Income Grants and Empirical Survival Probabilities
NOTE – Figure plots survival probabilities for two categories of unemployment
insurance claimants: those who live in states that have a one-week waiting period for
UI benefits and make no retroactive payment for this week (INC  0) and those who
live in states that either have no waiting week or make a retroactive payment (INC 
1). Claimants in the INC  1 states effectively receive an extra week of UI benefits
at the beginning of the spell relative to claimants in INC  0 states. See Table 2 for
description of sample selection procedures.





































NOTE – Figure shows empirical (solid) and predicted (dashed) survival curves for
two categories of UI claimants: those who live in states that have weekly benefit
amounts (WBA) below the mean and those who live in states that have WBAs above
the mean. The predicted survival curves are based on specification (2) in Table 3,
where the estimate of l  7.07.





































NOTE – Figure shows empirical (solid) and predicted (dashed) survival curves for
two categories of UI claimants: those who live in states that have weekly benefit
amounts (WBA) below the mean and those who live in states that have WBAs above
the mean. The predicted survival curves are based on estimates of the search model
without a measurement error correction in which the value of local curvature is
constrained to equal l  2.5. All other parameters are unrestricted.















Annual Income = 40000
Commitment    = 20000
Adjustment Cost = 7.5%               
S=9.03  s=7.21 
FIGURE 7
Consumption Commitments and Preferences over Wealth: An Empirical Characterization
NOTE – The solid curve characterizes utility over wealth of a committed agent based
on empirical estimates of the underlying utility function uh,f in the dynamic search
model. The utility that is plotted has a local curvature of l  7.37, based on the
empirical estimates of specification (1) in Table 3, and a global curvature of g  1.
The figure assumes that the agent has committed half of his $40,000 income prior to
entering this period to goods that have an adjustment cost of k  7.5%. In addition,
it assumes that the agent has an infinite horizon and does not face any credit
constraints. The empirical estimates imply that such an agent will retain his
commitment when his lifetime wealth is between s  $721,000 and S  $903,000,
accommodating wealth fluctuations by adjusting consumption only over the
uncommitted good in this region. The dashed curve extends utility in the committed
region outside the s,S band, showing what utility over wealth would look like if the
agent never abandoned his commitments.
61TABLE 1
MEAN HOUSEHOLD EXPENDITURE SHARES
Income Group
Category $5-10K $30-40K >$70K Overall Mean
Shelter 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.20
Transport (excluding gas and maint) 0.12 0.16 0.16 0.16
Utilities, fuels, and public services 0.10 0.07 0.06 0.07
Health care 0.09 0.06 0.04 0.06
Education 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.02
Food 0.16 0.16 0.14 0.15
Apparel 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.15
Household supplies and furniture 0.06 0.06 0.10 0.06
Entertainment 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.05
Miscellaneous 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02
Cash contributions 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.04
Mean annual expenditure $15,369 $32,609 $64,134 $35,930
Mean take-home pay $6,858 $29,720 $90,748 $41,531
NOTE – The values are based on tabulations by the Bureau of Labor Statistics from
the 2000 Consumer Expenditure Survey. Take-home pay is defined as gross income
net of taxes and mandatory insurance/pension contributions.
62TABLE 2
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR UI CLAIMANTS FROM THE SIPP
Standard
Variable            Mean         Median Deviation           Minimum            Maximum
Age 37.00 35.00 11.08 18.00 64.00
1 = Married 0.61 1.00 0.49 0.00 1.00
Education (years) 12.07 12.00 3.06 0.00 18.00
Dependents 0.52 0.00 0.96 0.00 8.00
Pre-unemployment weekly wage 413.96 355.11 272.78 0.00 3,393.81
Annual pre-unemp family income 42,195.51 35,344.00 35,621.44 0.00 1,351,164.00
Pre-unemp home equity 32,053.37 9,440.32 49,494.13 -49,486.39 431,482.60
Pre-unemp liquid wealth 22,715.79 2,027.97 64,997.21 -8,973.50 1,153,178.00
Liquid wealth net of unsec. debt 18,441.26 186.32 66,588.72 -651,057.00 1,153,178.00
Weekly UI benefit amount 165.80 162.30 50.46 46.10 354.18
1 = Waiting period 0.86 1.00 0.35 0.00 1.00
1 = Retroactive payment 0.17 0.00 0.38 0.00 1.00
Maximum potential duration (weeks) 32.11 26.00 6.42 22.00 39.00
State unemployment rate 6.60 6.50 1.70 2.30 14.10
Weeks to job finding or censoring 20.89 16.00 21.03 2.00 171.00
1 = Censored 0.22 0.00 0.41 0.00 1.00
NOTE – The values are based on tabulations from SIPP panels spanning 1985-2000. The
sample consists of the 4,457 prime-aged males who (1) took up unemployment insurance
benefits within one month of a job separation, (2) reported searching for a job at some point
during the spell, (3) never reported that they were on temporary layoff, and (4) were
unemployed for more than one week. Wealth data are collected only in certain topical
modules and are therefore available for only 2,530 observations. Liquid wealth is defined as
total wealth minus home equity and vehicle equity. All monetary variables are in 1990 dollars.
63TABLE 3
STRUCTURAL ESTIMATES OF SEARCH MODEL
(1) (2) (3) (4)
No Seam Restricted
Parameter Base Case Correction Baseline B=10,000
Local curvature(γ
l) 7.3632 7.0668 7.3826 6.1538
(2.07) (2.93) (2.79) (2.47)
Convexity of search effort (θ) 1.5455 1.5216 1.5436 1.5672
Disutility of labor (ψ$) 72.5300 77.5746 68.9114 48.0419
Baseline Job Finding Probs:
α1 0.0393 0.0369 0.0378 0.0266
α5 0.0363 0.0341 0.0251
α9 0.0378 0.0334 0.0363 0.0261
α13 0.0349 0.0291 0.0356 0.0240
α17 0.0326 0.0369 0.0224
α21 0.0284
α25 0.0319 0.0270 0.0311 0.0219
α32 0.0282 0.0270 0.0198
α40 0.0208 0.0199 0.0222 0.0146
α48 0.0215 0.0192 0.0146
α55 0.0171 0.0178 0.0185 0.0125
State unemployment rate (αu) -0.0460 -0.0445 -0.0459 -0.0775
Fraction of seam reporters (µ) 0.3283 0.3258 0.3197
Log likelihood value -12688.74 -13703.72 -12690.95 -12695.76
Sample size 4457 4457 4457 4457
NOTE – Each column reports estimates of the dynamic job search model. Standard
errors, reported in parentheses for l, are derived by inverting a likelihood ratio test.
Columns 1, 3, and 4 include a correction for mismeasurement of unemployment
durations to account for the seam recall problem discussed in the text. In columns
1-3, exogenous parameters for the search model are as follows: weekly wage
w  400, commitment h  200, pre-unemployment assets a  500, weekly discount
rate   0.91/50, disutility of labor $  100, welfare payment w  100, and
borrowing/late-payment constraint B  11,000. In column 4, B  10,000. See
notes to Table 2 for description of sample selection procedures.
64